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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation & 
Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
 
In the early 1980s when America was under Reagan administration  there were some 
American efforts in order to convince the most influential countries in Europe through 
which a proposed Soviet gas pipeline was planed  to be built to set impedements to  
firms responsible for construction the ability to purchase supplies and parts for the 
pipeline and associated facilities. Despite this fear  and several protests the pipeline 
was built. Then that induced the rise of large Russian gas firms such as Gazprom, in 
addition to an increased fossil fuel production in Russia. The both have facilitated a 
large expansion in the quantity of gas supplied to the European market since the 
1990s. Nowadays, the Russian Federation is largest exporter of oil and natural gas to 
the European Union as  supplies a significant volume of fossil fuels. In 2007, the 
European Union imported from Russia 185 million tonnes of crude oil, which 
accounted for 32.6% of total oil import, and 100.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent of 
natural gas, which accounted 38.7% of total gas import. One of the biggest Russian 
state-owned companies, Gazprom exports from north to south natural gas to Europe.  
Furthermore, Gazprom also controls a large number of subsidiaries, including various 
infrastructures as well as assets. According to the study published by the Research 
Centre for East European Studies, the liberalization of the EU gas market has driven to 
expansion of Gazprom across Europe by increasing its share in the European 
downstream market. In addition Gazprom in order to entrench its position  has 
established sale subsidiaries in many of its export markets, and has also made 
investments  in access providers to industrial and power generation sectors especially 
in Western and Central Europe. Furthermore, Gazprom has established joint ventures 
to construct natural gas pipelines and build storage depots in a number of European 
countries. Transneft, an other Russian state-owned company responsible for the 
national oil pipelines, also supplies Russian  energy to Europe  As of 2009, Russian 
natural gas was delivered to Europe through 12 pipelines, of which three were direct 
pipelines (to Finland, Estonia and Latvia), four through Belarus (to Lithuania and 
Poland) and five through Ukraine (to Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland). In 2011, 
an additional pipeline, Nord Stream (directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea), made 
its debout. 
What is more, Russia as an energy treasury is the only country on the earth that’s plans  
to use floating nuclear power plants. The Akademik Lomonosov, expected to go into 
operation by 2019, will be one of eight plants that will provide power to Russian cities 
located across the coastline. There are also plans for the future for these plants to 
provide power to large gas rigs in the Arctic Ocean in order to enhance its presence 
over this disputable by other nations region. The Prirazlomnoye field, an offshore 
oilfield in the Pechora Sea,  the first commercial offshore oil development in the Arctic 
that  includes up to 40 wells, went into operation in 2013 with little delay has  the 
world's first ice-resistant oil platform and is the first offshore Arctic platform. Russia 
currently great engagement with the wells in Arctic have to do with the fact that 
Russia  wants to establish its Arctic possessions as a major resource base by 2020 so as 
  
to be much secure in supply and also to assert clearly its claims over this region. As 
climate change force the ice melt down , more and more arctic surface can be 
explored. Besides,the temperature increase in conjuction with ice shrinking makes the 
Arctic areas more accessible, Russia, along with other countries, is looking to use the 
Arctic to increase its energy resource production. According to the U.S. Geological 
Survey, there are 90 billion barrels (1.4×1010 m3) of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet 
(4.7×1013 m3) of natural gas north of the Arctic Circle. Overall, about 10% of the 
world's petroleum resources are estimated to be in the Arctic.  
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Introduction 
 This paper discusses the argument of whether Russia remains a core politcal player 
within the energy market and also its reliability across EU. Europe continues to  need 
gas from Russia because of the fact that  Russia is close enough to Central Europe and 
its supply prices are affordable  is a reality. Within this study I would like to shed light 
and give a full answer on whether Russia is the best of bad lot in Energy politics as a 
gas supplier. 
The EU – Russia relationship, although being a ‘strategic partnership’ that make both 
sides to have strong ties with each other, it will be argued that, the overall EU-Russia 
relationship is mainly characterised by strategic rivalry. Howeve,r the “special 
primitive”relationships that Russia develops with key EU countries such as Germany 
are an integral part of Moscow’s “divide and rule” strategy towards the EU, an 
intentional effort to impede the coherence among European countries and to  
exacerbate the intrigues and divisions between member states while securing further 
deals and benefits for Gazprom,basically, trying to excercise control over EU energy 
security. One of the closest bilateral relationships the Russian - German relationship, is 
also a prime example of how ‘economic nationalism’ combined with Moscow’s ‘divide 
and rule’ strategy gradually wears away  the EU’s efforts for an united harmonic as 
well as  cohesive energy security policy, and its most significant outcome the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline – with potentially extremely serious  geopolitical consequences, 
will then be examined in detail. Last but not least, and foremost, this paper will adress 
the issue that ,between of EU and Russia  the most underlying problem in its energy, 
and overall aspects , is a fundamental misperception of the nature of Russia.  Without  
any solid common policy , Russia is overwhelmigly in the place to have the advantage 
of controlling decisions. Historical memories and also national pride make Russia a 
worth analysing example of global politics. 
 
According to the world's total reserves as percentages, Russia holds 45% of the gas, 
23% of the coal, 14% of the uranium, and 13% of the oil on global system. In Russia Oil 
production and  export had increased dramatically since the early 21st century, 
exceeding temporarily in 2006  Saudi Arabia’s production. Since 2016, Russia is the top 
crude oil producer. Russia is also the world’s largest energy producer. Russia is not a 
member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries or simply OPEC and 
presents itself as a competitive  alternative to middle eastern energy resources, such 
as Saudi Arabia , Qatar, Kuwait e.t.c asserting that it is in fact a " trustful energy 
supplier with reliability and   that in order to foster global energy security  seeks to use 
its position as an important supplier". Meanwhile ,  The energy strategy document 
defines the main priority of Russian energy strategy as an increase in energy efficiency 
(meaning decreasing of energy intensity in production and energy supply 
expenditures), reducing harmful effects  on the environment, fostering sustainable 
development, energy optimization routes  and technological development, as well as 
an improvement of effectiveness and competitiveness through pipelines and Logistics 
network 
 
 More specifically,I have separated my study in the following chapters. 
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In the first chapter there would be a brief report on the  liberalisation of the EU energy 
market, a way to fascilitate the expansion of Russian natural gas into the markets of 
Europe , citing also data of the EU dependency of Russian natural gas as well as to the 
special relation between Russia of Putin  and  Germany of Angela Merkel. 
The second chapter will be referred to the Geopolitcs of the region, how Russia  
inflitrates in Europe’s politics as a result of european addiction on russian gas and the 
role of Germany. 
In the third chapter it would be adressed the strategies Russia follows in order to face 
the Western expansion and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute as well as the Crimea crisis. 
The efforts of the Western world to support and include Ukraine into the western era 
of influence.  
The fourth chapter would make an outline of the role of Gazprom via the pipelines 
Nordstream and South stream. T 
The fifth part of the study will include all the conclusive remarks regarding the 
question whether Russia is really a threat for the energy security of Europe and  to 
what extent  the public thought in world politics is too prejudiced or biased about 
Russia.   
This dissertation may lead to a better understanding of the world natural resources 
politics and also to foster a much figurative view of Russian Federation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Energy Market. 
 
 To begin with, in the European Union one of the most used fuels is undeniably  the 
natural gas, accounting for almost 25% of our primary energy. In 2006 around 38% of 
this gas was originated from the EU, in particular such as  the UK, Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, Denmark and Romania contribute to energy production within the 
Union. More than half, almost 54% is imported, and this proportion has an increasing 
tendency.Along with Norway (16%) and Algeria (10%) and  particularly  Russia (23%) 
are traditionally the most significant sources of gas imported to the European Union, 
despite the fact that  imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by ship are growing fast 
and there is a diverse range of suppliers  (Egypt, Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad, Qatar, Oman) 
contributing to the diversification of supply and energy security as well. As gas 
production in the EU countries  gradually falls in  numbers  in the coming years ahead 
energy imports from third countries are expected to increase dramatically. 
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Picture 1: Recipients of  Russian natural gas ( Source: EIA) 
 
 
 As far as the EU market concerned , there is not yet a common line of dealing with 
external factors due to the variety of opinions that cannot form  a solid common 
policy. The EU’s market-approach towards energy security is actually  undermined 
from within the Union institutions. In essence, because of the fact that  the EU 
Commission is devoid of  formal legitimacy over the energy policies of the member 
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states, the EU countries pursue and support  energy policies that best serve their 
national interests economies that the energy policy from Brussels and in specific areas 
are considerably conflicting with each other. Under this reality , it will be argued that, 
key EU countries such as France and Germany are implementig and planning policies of 
‘economic nationalism’, where the commercial interests of their respective national 
energy “titans”, take precedence over the common energy security interests of the 
Union .However, numerous bilateral agreements between these nation’s national 
energy champions with Russia’s top energy company Gazprom are one of the main 
obstacles for a cohesive EU energy security policy.  Russian energy policy will then be 
examined, as it constitutes an undeniable part of the country’s foreign policy. It will be 
asserted that, Russia is, basically, trying to regain its lost position in the international 
political arena, and is struggling to do so with a distinctly realist approach based on 
strategic energy resources .Taking into consideration the core values of realism, and in 
contrast to the EU’s institutionalism and multilateralism, statecentrism and serving  of 
national interests between EU nations ,dominate Russian foreign policy strategy 
because it based on realism and rationalism 
 
Energy Policy of Russia  
 
In russian politics, energy policy is also an integral part of foreign policy. As will be 
shown throughout this paper, Russia uses energy supplies and  as a foreign policy tool, 
particularly in its ‘near abroad’, countries within Moscow’s sphere of influence such as 
Belarus, Ukraine and Baltic states.  Russian geopolitical realism comes into 
disagreement with policies of the EU in the ‘common neighbourhood’, but also in the 
Caspian, where EU is trying to establish new energy relationships with the regional 
nations in order find new  energy suppliers  away from  Russia. Russian security of 
demand is of high essence in order to excercise control in other nation’s politics To 
protect its own energy security  and to maintain its strategically highly advantageous 
position as the dominant supplier of gas to Europe, Russia is actively undermining the 
Brussels  efforts for diversification of supply energy sources.  
 
 
  
 Under the scenario mentioned above  Russian Federation is predicted to be one of the 
top gas suppliers to EU. Currently,  Russian energy policy is focused on both crucial 
energy resources such as oil and gas  and handles them as strategic goods to pursue its 
own policies. This entails a dependence  on the direct influence of state actors rather 
than on market forces to regulate their extraction and distribution as well. Indeed, this 
has been common  in oil and gas exporting countries since the 1970s, however, Russia 
considers exlusively  itself  a “great power and big supplier”  and  no other 
hydrocarbon exporter considers itself to be a “great power” too. Increasing state 
influence and regulation by legislative manipulation can be seen, on the one hand, as a 
deliberate policy enabling the state to use oil and gas corporations, especially 
‘Gazprom and Rosneft’, as both domestic and foreign policy tools in the absence of 
other agreeable  instruments (for instance institutional), and on the other hand, as the 
result of spontaneous processes of property redistribution to the administration, 
especially the security services. As the gas sector concerns,  there were modifications  
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and ammendments in the relevant laws that  consolidated the positions of majority 
state-owned companies, especially Gazprom. Gazprom obtained the exclusive 
monopoly  on all gas exports, Gazprom has also acquired  the legal right in front of the 
Russian auhtorities  to be awarded certain exploration licenses without competition 
from the state. In other words Gazprom is an active tool of  Russian goverment board 
to serve the interests of the goverment itself.  As a result, competition is non-existent 
and foreign ownership is depended  on the decisions of the monopolist and of political 
actors that they have the exclusive rights to rule the market and define the 
competition . In an effort to excercice control over interdependencies politically, many  
oil companies of foreign interests  with  notworthy shares   or even controlling 
percentages  in oil or gas exploration have been forced to flee  the country or to 
minimise  their stakes to below than 25 percent. The expropriation of Yukos (one of 
the world’s largest non-state oil companies) is considered to be  as the most visible 
example of arbitrary state action, with a narrow elite taking advantage of this action. 
Yukos shareholders sued Russia for deliberate discriminatory and unequal treatment.  
The Yukos case is known better as   a row of  international court and arbitral cases 
demanding  compensation to be awarded  from the government of Russia to the 
former shareholders of Yukos based on the claim that Russian courts were not acting 
in good faith and  non discriminatory  by  launching tax evasion criminal proceedings 
against Yukos, Then Yukos company bankrupted as a result of the biased actions of 
Russian courts. 
 
 Meanwhile, as the  dependance  on companies of govermental interests increases 
dramatically, that has  led to a deinstitutionalization of the oil and gas sector and the 
management is primarly excercised in agreement with the state interests. In other 
words, the  federal politico-economic elite serves uninterruptedly its economic 
interests  in rent capture and political control.  Energy Relations between Russia and 
other countries also affect the external behavior of energy companies. Gazprom and 
Rosneft are used as foreign policy strategy  tools to obtain leverage over controversial 
resource scarce countries in the EU’s neighborhood, such as Georgia or Ukraine.For  
instance is the  beggining of drilling for oil off the coast of Abkhazia. Abkhazia is a semi 
autonomous region located in the northern western part of Republic of Georgia , is 
recognised only by Russia and a small number of other countries worldwide. While 
Georgia lacks control over Abkhazia, the government of Georgia , the United Nations 
and the majority of the world's governments consider Abkhazia part of Georgia, whose 
constitution designates and encompasses  the area as the Autonomous Republic of 
Abkhazia. However   Moscow, in intergovernmental speeches , hinted that it might 
recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia while  Western countries recognised the 
independence of Kosovo (de juri Serbian province) , suggesting that they had created a 
precedent that is hard to neglect because the beginning has already happened. On the 
aftermath of  Kosovo's declaration for  independence , the Russian parliament released 
a joint statement reading: "Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an 
international precedent, Russia should take into account the Kosovo scenario when 
considering ongoing territorial conflicts." At first , Russia continued  to delay 
recognition of both of these republics. However, on 16 April 2008, the outgoing 
Russian president Vladimir Putin instructed his government to establish official ties 
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a result that leads to Georgia's condemnation of 
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what it described as an endeavour  of  "de facto annexation" and condemnation  from 
the European Union, NATO, and several Western governments. By this way , Russia 
wants not only to show her remaining strength to former Soviet states that are 
gradually moving towards Western sphere of influence but also to confirm its position 
in global politics that still consists a very strong and formidable power that is ready to 
face any threat. 
 
 The case of Gazprom 
 
Gazprom is a large Russian company founded in 1989, its main duties are the 
extraction, production, transport, and sale of natural gas. The company is  owned in 
majority by the Government of Russian Federation  and  private shareholders own the 
rest 40,77% and has many subsidiaries throughout Russia. Gazprom is an effective 
foreign policy tool as  its conrol is under Moscow’s  rule and the company has  
monopolistic activities as those of  both extraction and transport of gas.That  seems to 
provide the Kremlin with an ammunitiion without cartridge. Gazprom's production 
fields are located around the Gulf of Ob in Western Siberia. Plans have also been made 
to mine the Yamal Peninsula. Gazprom's gas transport system includes 158,200 
kilometres of gas trunk lines. Projects include Nord Stream and South Stream that 
stroke Western Europe with natural gas either from the north part (Nord Stream) or 
from the south parts ( South Stream).  
 
 
In the interim, Gazprom takes advantage of its position in the energy supply routes to 
the West  and trying to block the EU’s diversification plans by launching competing 
pipeline projects and courting potential suppliers in third countries  according to Milov 
(2008: 6). At the same time, state entreprises have the ability  to have access  capital 
on European financial markets on favorable terms because of the fact that they are 
backed as  they receive from the state. As I have already mentioned above the EU 
imports almost  25 percent of its gas from Russia, while Gazprom revenues are mainly 
inflowed more than 60 percent from EU markets. However, the situation is more 
complicated than that and the perception of depending one country from another (in 
this case European countries and Russia) overshadows the various disproportions 
within  this relationship. Gazprom is a corporation following the orders of Moscow, 
which is bound rather by the goals of state actors than by private shareholders. 
Furthermore, in russian overall exports to the EU markets in 2007 gas exports 
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accounted for only six percent, while oil and oil products made up 67 percent. 
Correspondingly, Gazprom contributed only about eight percent to the Russian federal 
budget in comparison to the oil sector which  is estimated more than 35%.  Thus, the 
disproportion of the EU Russia dependency lies not only in the fact that money has 
different characteristics from natural gas , money being a highly fungible good and gas 
supplies a rather specific one  according to Liuhto (2009).In addition ,  Russia is much 
less dependent on gas than on oil exports on the contrary the EU depends on Russian 
gas supplies a lot more than on Russian oil.  
 
Kremlin’s policy through Gazprom 
 
Kremlin has used gas exports as a foreign policy strategy tool  in order to assert itself 
and put pressures  in its near neighbourhood at several occasions since the dissolution  
of the Soviet Union, even before the 2006 crisis according to Umbach (2010: 1230). For 
example, Moscow  made reductions of gas supply to the Baltic States so as to assert 
pressure during a dispute about Russian-speaking minorities and Russian military 
facilities on Baltic territory in 1992/93. Moreover,  in the early 1990s gas disruptions 
were also used as a means for pressure  during a conflict with Ukraine about the Black 
Sea Fleet. After the dispute resolution, Ukraine was awarded  price reductions of 30% 
on its gas imports according to Smith Stegen (2011: 6509). Generally, there seems to 
be a direct connection  between the gas prices paid by the neighbour countries around  
Russia and the political (more or less pro-Russian) orientation of the respective 
governments (Smith Stegen 2011: 6509). Thus, russian energy policy could be partially,  
considered  as an attempt to put under Kremlin’s control the states of Russia’s direct 
neighborhood and also to enhance its power within its sphere of influence‟, including 
countries of the former USSR and the Warsaw Pact . 
  
Currently Gazprom via Nord and South Stream has spread through West Europe as the 
following map depicts. 
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Picture 2 : Nord and South Stream Projections ( Source: www.energy.eu) 
 
 
When Vladimir Putin was  the president of Russian Federation (1999-now)that period 
of time  is especially  associated with geopolitical realism according to  Feklyunina 
(2008: 130), Light (2008: 15) and Rumer (2007: 23). In Europe , the EU Commission 
pressed  for  the gradual liberalisation of gas and energy markets, notably after the 
turning point of 2006, whereas this process has been halted and even reversed in the 
Russian Federation  according to Belyi (2009: 122) State monopolies that are used as 
foreign policy tools is a reality in Russian politics. With Putin‟s personal ambition to 
consolidate  Russia as an „energy superpower‟ in the international sphere, energy 
sector is dominated by state surveillance and  control. Moreover, decision making 
process is under Kremlin’s influence  as it has been strengthened through a range of 
legislative initiatives aiming at setting impedements to much of the energy sector 
privatisation of the 1990s. Somentimes it was accomplished  in an extremely dubious 
manner for example the Yukos case . Under Putin’s leadership the Russian largest 
energy companies were staffed with prominent fugures and ‘’close’’ partners of the 
presidential administration  , which is indicative of the intertwined relationship of the 
Kremlin and the Russian energy sector. According to Smith Stegen (2011:6507), 
Russian anti-monopoly regulations were removed in 2007 , that enabled the Kremlin to 
also acquire substantial shares in the main remaining private gas producers, notably 
Itera and Novatek, through Gazprom AS, while the gas sector in Russia indisputably 
involves a wide range of actors, including different “ministries of the  Federal 
Government, regional administrations  and legislative assemblies,  energy companies, 
and other business and financial actors”, it is the presidential administration which has 
established a dominant control over both the exploration and transport of gas across  
Russian territory and that of its immediate surroundings (Tkachenko 2008: 163. 
Gazprom is the mandatory on behalf of Kremlin to execute its orders.  While Gazprom 
claims to bea commercial energy company that simply provide under free trade rules 
energy to Euripe , it is said to be by critics as something similar to a Foreign Ministry,  
or a parallel government that obeys the orders of Russian political elite” (Tkachenko 
2008: 186) or even as “synonymous with the Kremlin” (Light 2008: 18). An offspring of 
the former Soviet Ministry of the Gas Industry, Gazprom got into privatisation after the 
fall  of the USSR. In 2004/05, nonetheless, the Kremlin bought 51% of the company‟s 
shares, effectively bringing it under Moscow’s control. While outwardly it seems to be 
a private company which serves the shareholders interests as routine management of 
Gazprom and its estimated 170 subsidiary companies remains with managers rather 
than bureaucrats, strategic decisions of Gazprom are determined at the highest 
political level in Russia (Westphal 2006: 54). Putin furthermore changed the leadership 
of Gazprom, appointing Aleksey Miller - a personal friend and a former member of the 
St. Petersburg administration  as chief executive officer (Tkachenko 2008: 185). This 
political control over Gazprom, and the company‟s monopoly over both extraction and 
transport of gas, seems to provide the Kremlin with an effective foreign policy tool as 
we have already outlined above. 
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Strategic Energy Resources 
 
Energy resources have a crucial position  in the revival of Russia. Putin, the main leader  
of Russia’s drive for ‘greatness’ (Helm 2007: 17), wanted to exploit the presence of 
natural resources in strengthening Russia’s economy as by this potential to revive 
Russia before he became president. Putin asserted in  his 1997 doctoral thesis 
asserted, natural resources, but in particular, fossil fuels have a tremendous potential  
in the restoration of Russia’s economy after the dissolution of the USSR. Economic 
growth and cash inflows from the West , in turn, was seen by Putin as a fundamental 
for political power and influence in the international arena according to Heinrich 
(2008: 1542) and  Tkachenko (2007: 171). Among others the thesis outlined that 
natural resources , or the “‘strategic sector’ not only as a key to economic 
restructuring  but also or even primarily as an instrument of Russia’s geopolitical factor  
as a future superpower in energy supply in the region” according to Umbach (2006: 
68). So, the control of the ‘strategic sector’ was, according to Putin, too important for 
the national interest to be left to private business (Lucas 2008: 163). Accordingly, 
during Putin’s presidency, the sector of natural resources was heavily swifted away 
from private hands to state ownership. Along with the nationalising process  Putin 
aimed to restore  state capacity and to secure  independence of state authority from 
economic interest groups with expectation to  rebuild the central state and to establish 
the presidential administration as the dominant political institution in Russia” (Heinrich 
2008: 1542). This, in effect,provoked distress and reactions to energy oligarchs who 
had enjoyed convenience under Yeltsin’s presidency. Arbitrary accusations were made 
against several prominent figures, most importantly Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos,  
who was then imprisoned along with the closing of one of the biggest companies in 
Russia (Helm 2007: 19-20). However, the Russian government prefered in some cases 
to staff these companies with prominent figures from Putin’s inner circle in order to 
aquire control over the decision making process, rather than outright  enforcement of 
nationalisation of other energy companies, (Tkachenko 2007: 167-168). This 
politicisation process was, by far, taken furthest in the case of Gazprom, resulting in a 
situation where, as Van Der Meulen (2009: 849) points out, “the Russian state as 
majority shareholder directly controls supply and transmission of gas in Russia in 
accordance with its geopolitical objectives”. Putin’s concept of ‘energy superpower’ 
and the politicisation of Gazprom epitomises, according to Baev (2008: 118), the 
“blending of energy business and power politics, where the aims of profit maximisation 
and building positions of power are barely distinguishable”. 
 
The phenomenon of Russia to control and secure natural resources under Kremlin rule 
is characterised by Grigoryev (2007:3037)  as ‘’resource nationalism’’. The concept of 
remaining strategic resources ( fossil fuels, oil, gas) under state control is not only a 
Russian phenomenon, rather, it is a common phenomenon  among energy-rich nations 
such as USA , with stateowned companies controlling up 85-90% of the world’s oil and 
gas reserves (Umbach 2010: 1232; Helm 2007: 24). Generally , resource nationalism is 
interpreted as government-pursued policies aiming at setting under state control oil 
and gas assets while setting blocks to the participation  of international energy 
companies for owning oil and gas assets, thus providing clear competitive advantages 
for the country’s national champions according to Milov (2008: 3). If access is given to 
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international companies, it is done in a “totally non-transparent, arbitrary, and 
politically charged manner” (Milov 2008: 4).For instance, Russia choses the countries 
that can offer access to its strategic sectors. Thus Russia has deliberately  awarded 
limited access to its strategic sectors to German, French, and Italian energy companies. 
The  countries as mentioned above, maintain ‘special relationships’ with Russia thus 
their access to the Russian energy resources is clearly politically-motivated and to  
Germany particularly as it would be argued afterwards. On the contrary, American, 
British and Dutch energy companies have seen their licenses revoked on arbitrary 
grounds (Milov 2008: 4; Smith 2008: 13). By default, resource nationalism  induces 
problems and creates a very unfavourable atmosphere for multilateral cooperation in 
the energy field as every big country treats under no equal rules and under 
discriminatory way the international companies who attempt to invest in their 
countries (Milov 2008: 4). The political integration  of the Russian energy sector, and 
particularly, the tight control that the Kremlin exerts over Gazprom, are one of the 
main obstacles for a closer cooperation  and more institutionalised energy relationship 
between the EU and Russia. On the one hand,  the state-centric Russian policy and 
from the other hand  the EU’s institutionalist and neoliberal approach come in 
contradiciton as they are totally diferrent with each other. Every aspect of Energy 
Charter Treaty- ECT  is met by defiance with Russian resource nationalism, upon which 
the EU is trying to  set common rules of cooperation with both EU and Russian 
Federation.  While the EU is seeking to bring energy relations with third countries 
under international law through the ECT in order to promote a more liberal, free  and 
stable energy market, Russia treats foreign investors under discriminatory terms and 
that is the rule  that EU  is trying to prevent. In accordance with its realpolitik approach 
to international relations, the Russian leadership has shown and proved  reluctance to 
partake in legally-binding international agreements with the fear the  would limit the 
country’s freedom of manoeuvre and the serving  of its national interests. Taking all 
the above into account Russia considers natural resources as a strategic tools not only 
for foreign relations but also for economic revival and the re-establishment of its 
position in the international arena, under this reality  it is very unlikely that Russia 
would sign any legally-binding international agreements in relation to energy according 
to Milov (2008: 14-15). 
 
Nevertheless, officials of the administrations of Putin and of his successor Dmitri 
Medvedev have constantly denied that Russia uses its energy resources as a political 
instrument (Smith 2008: 1), there remains little doubt that energy has become one of 
the most important tools of Russian foreign policy (Leal-Arcas 2009: 355; Morozov 
2007: 54, 58; Riley & Umbach 2007: 83; Umbach 2006: 68). Indeed, Russia’s natural 
resources is one of the most valuable and precious tools to make  use in negogiations 
globally. “energy, especially natural gas and oil, now represents the most effective and 
‘civilised’ power political instrument for the Russian government in the international 
arena” (Tkachenko 2007: 163). One of the examples  of the Russian use of energy as a 
foreign policy tool is when Russia cut off  gas deliveries to Belarus. Gazprom, acting as 
an instrument of Kremlin executes orders  of President Medvedev and  reduced the 
deliveries by 30%, in an effort to put pressure and compel Belarus to settle a debt of 
$200m. As a responce Belarus  threatened to postpone the transit of Russian gas 
towards EU, potentially affecting 6% of the EU’s gas consumption, claiming that 
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Gazprom owed the country $260m in transit fees (BBC 2010b, 2010c). Although the 
dispute was quietly settled before it got into escalation and affected EU supply, with 
both parties settling at least a part of their respective debts (Euronews 2010), it was 
another textbook example of Russia using energy as foreign policy tool to succeed its 
goals with no direct political conflict. In May 2009, the EU started again negotiations 
and reopned its relations to Belarus after a period of frozen relations due to severe 
human rights violations in the country among others and invited Belarus to become 
part of the EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ (BBC 2009). Despite the fact that Belarus keeps 
tight contacts and maintains the closest relations to Russia of all the fomer Soviet 
Union republics, for instance a joint defensive agreement between Moscow and 
Minsk, the increased cooperation between Brussels (EU) and Minsk had as a result the 
souring of Belarusian-Russian relations (BBC 2009). As far as the  June 2010 gas dispute 
concerned , was first and foremost a Russian political show of ascendancy and power 
and a means to reconsolidate Moscow’s influence over Belarus. More or less 
Belarussia or “White Russia” as its actual meaning is a satellite country of Russia. Less 
than two weeks after the dispute Belarus agreed to join Russia and Kazakhstan in a 
customs union (BBC 2010d). The European authorities realised that, the dispute had an 
adverse outcome as Russia was able to undermine Brussels’ inflitration in Belarus,  and 
to strengthen Russian influence instead. However, the long-term implications of 
Moscow’s actions in case mentioned above exceed by far the policy setbacks to the 
Eastern Partnership. “Russia clearly demonstrated its continued preparedness to take 
its national interests under threat,the smooth flow of gas to Europe through Belarus in 
order to promote its political and security interests – the consolidation of its sphere of 
influence – in a distinctly realist manner, as asserted by Waltz” (1979: 107). 
 
Divide and Rule Strategy 
 
Russia prefers to deal with its international partners on a bilateral basis. This 
preference for bilateral dealing  constitutes a problem to the EU-Russia energy 
relationship (Leonard & Popescu 2007: 13; Light 2008: 24-25). As a result of its view of 
international relations, Russia bypasses the Institutions of European Union in its 
energy dealings with a EU nation and prefers to deal directly with its country-
partner.Characteristic is the following statement in 2007 of the chair of the Duma’s 
committee on international relations that, “we are sick and tired of dealing with 
Brussels bureaucrats” and among others also stated the following “the EU is not an 
institution that contributes to our relationship, but an institution that slows down 
progress” (quoted in Leonard & Popescu 2007: 14). Russia also prefers this bilateralism 
because of the fact that EU is still unable to form a common strategy energy security 
policy , something that the Kremlin interprets as a “manifestation of its systemic 
weakness” (Smith 2008: 2). In fact , this inability of EU member states to agree on a 
common wide dealing policy on energy issues has given  Moscow the opportunity, to 
further exacerbate the division  on energy issues between EU member states. That is 
because EU countries have quite differences with each other and every nation pursuits 
its own interests regardless of the signed Treaty of Maastricht. In what commentators 
have dubbed as the ‘divide and rule’ strategy, Moscow through its instrument 
Gazprom aims in  setting up bilateral deals with individual EU countries with different 
offers and compromises , further driving a split between member states, while 
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enhancing the overall European dependence on Russian  gas (Baran 2007: 131; Finon & 
Loccatelli 2008: 430; Leonard & Popescu 2007: 13-16; Lucas 2008: 166; Smith 2008: 2-
3; Umbach 2010: 1237). 
 
Taking into account the ineffective EU structure of a cohesive EU approach and the 
divide and rule strategy of Russia as we explained above. This combination  has 
allowed Moscow to set obstacles to any European diversification attempts in the form 
of construction of alternative pipeline-routes from the Caspian and Central Asia 
directly to Europe according to Baran (2007: 131). The most apt example of the 
Russian strategy of undermining EU planned alternative suppliers except for Russian 
companies is Moscow’s attempt to torpedo the Nabucco pipeline project, which is 
designed to transport gas from the Caspian, in particular Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 
directly to Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria (Baran 
2007: 138; Lucas 2008: 176). As Gazprom saw this project as a great threat to its 
monopoly in Europe, Moscow launched an extensive campaign on undermining the 
project and offering an alternative pipeline imitating the route of Nabucco. Russia 
proposed the alternative South Stream pipeline which was designed to cross under the 
Black Sea and through the Balkans, to Italy, Hungary, and Austria, and would be jointly 
built with Italy’s national champion ENI. Because of the fact that it is designed to  cross 
under the Black Sea, the project is estimated to cost at least twice as much as the 
Nabucco, so the project is based on geopolitical criteria rather than  economic and 
commercial interests. In fact South stream was planned to run through Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania , Serbia and Hungary with exchange the political support of the 
aforementioned countries to the projecgt. The project created controversy because it 
did not comply with European Union competition and energy legislation, in particular 
the Third Energy Package, which stipulates the unbundling of companies' generation 
and sale operations from their transmission networks. For Moscow was of high 
importance to eliminate the Nabucco alternative as it imperils its interests in the 
region. What is more, Hungary and Austria , the two countries where the Nabucco was 
planned to terminate, played a crucial role. On the one hand in 2007 Hungary was the 
first to support  the South Stream after Russia promises of making the country a hub 
for Russian-exported gas in the region (Baev 2008: 123; Lucas 2008: 179-180). The 
Prime Minister of Hungary, Ferenc Gyurcsány was quoted saying in March 2007 that 
while the Nabucco remained a mere plan, the Russian alternative was “backed by a 
very strong will and a very strong organisational power...We do not need dreams We 
need projects” (quoted in Baran 2007: 140; Lucas 2007: 179). On the other hand,  
Austria acted in like manner in early 2008 by signing extensive long-term energy deals 
with Russia, including an agreement to sell Gazprom a 50% stake in the Baumgarten 
gas hub , a transit terminal for approximately one third of all Russian gas supplies to 
the EU (Lucas 2008: 179-180; Smith 2008: 6). Nonetheless, both Austria and Hungary 
also stood by   the Nabucco in 2009. 
 
The most important devide and rule strategy that Russia follows is the bilateralisation 
of foreign relations. Russia prefers to negotiate and bargain every time with only one 
nation in contrast with a whole Union such as EU. Kremlin focuses on separate 
diplomatic relations for example with Italy , Germany and France , the three most 
significant economies across EU apart from United Kindom. Putin’s main goal is to 
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maintain close personal relationships with the leaders of Germany, France and Italy.By 
this way Moscow was able to create an exclusive club of countries who all regarded 
themselves as ‘small great powers’ and have the right and prestige to private 
negotiations outside of the EU umbrella. Indeed, as Smith (2008: 3) points out, the club 
of the leaders of France, Italy, and Germany, “met frequently with President Putin to 
decide among themselves key Russian-European policies, thus making Europe’s united 
policy towards Russia an absolute fiasco”. The common agreed agendas of the EU are 
overlooked by these special relationships with Europe’s economic champions.  
 
German – Russian relations 
 
By far the most worth analysing example of Russia’s relationships, is the relationship 
between Russia and the Federal Republic of  Germany, with roots in long time  strong 
economic bonds between these countries. Germany was one of the most significant 
trading partner for Russia even before the First World War, throughout the inter-war 
period, and  during the Cold War as well (Leonard & Popescu 2007: 32; Lucas 2008: 
171-172). Currently, “Germany is Russia’s biggest trading partner, its biggest 
international creditor, and a worthy investor” (Westphal 2007: 97) ,(see Picture 3). The  
energy relationship between these countries made its debout in the 1970s and was a 
part and parcel of the German Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik was a concept that has to do with  
the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West 
Germany) and Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic (GDR or 
East Germany) beginning in 1969. What is more,was a strategic element in the détente 
(Helm 2007: 35; Westphal 2007: 93-94). The German approach after the WWII towards 
the Soviet Union was characterised by a degree of guilt and the resulting desire to 
assume the role of a mediator between the West and East. By 2000s, the political and 
economic dimensions of the Russo-German energy relationship have been tightened 
because Germany combined along with its energy policy goals specific business 
interests“,and not anymore security aspects. 
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Picture 3 : German – Russian trading relations (Source: zerohedge.com) 
 
 
 
The German energy sector has by far the closest relationship with its Russian 
counterpart of any other EU member states. Germany’s national gas champion E.ON 
Ruhrgas, is the largest foreign shareholder of Gazprom, controlling 6.5% of its shares 
with the companies’ executives sitting in each other’s boards according to Lucas (2008: 
173)and Westphal (2007: 102). 
 
E.ON Ruhrgas and other German energy companies have been accorded access to the 
strategic sector’ of Russia, where few other Western companies are allowed to run 
operations.The very close personal relationship between President  Vladimir Putin and 
the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and also the current German 
Kanzlerin Angela Merkel has given this special treatment granted to German energy 
companies to acquire shares from Gazprom. According to Lucas (2008: 166) it is 
described as  “the most notorious diplomatic alliance in Europe’s modern history”. 
Schöder firstly wanted to have the driver’s seat in the West’s relationship with Russia, 
while granting Putin close channels to Germany, which is seen as the ‘gateway’ to 
Europe, and securing him the support of the German government for Moscow’s 
broader policies toward Europe according to Smith (2008: 12).  
 
According to Westphal (2007: 105), the Schröder promoted cooperation in the fields of 
economics and trade more than anything else. The German policy toward Russia 
proves the fact that domestic economic interests build  the overall policy approach of 
the Schröder governments, in effect, German ‘economic nationalism’ dictated not only 
the bilateral Russo-German relationship, but also the approach to Russia that Germany 
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wanted the EU to adopt  according to Westphal (2007: 106).The interests of German 
energy champions such as E.ON Ruhrgas lying along the close relations with Gazprom 
due to the fact that Germany is granted access to Russian energy sources thus  is able 
to strengthen its positions not only domestically as well as internationally.Because of 
its governments’ strong support of the interests of its national energy champions, 
According to Smith (2008:14) Germany is generally considered to be the leading 
opponent and obstacle for  the adoption of a common and cohesive EU wide energy 
security policy. 
 
 
Picture 4: The German and the Russian flag (Source: Stuttgarter Zeitung.de) 
 
Germany- Russia connecting paths 
 
full of contradictions and  common interests Germany and Russia have a more 
complicated relationship to analyse than perhaps any other pair of countries.  
 
All in all, the Soviet Union liberated Berlin in 1945 but, on the other hand, then 
dominated East Germans for most of the next half century. East Germans (like Angela 
Merkel) grew up learning Russian in school, and Russian officials in Germany (like KGB 
officer Vladimir Putin) mastered the German language. They speak the same tongues. 
Angela and Vladimir know each other from childhood. The both economies are 
strongly interconnected with each other. Germany manufactures the industrial 
chemical products and the machinery that Russia needs to modernise its economy, as 
well as the cars which rich Russians like to drive. And Russia produces the gas on which 
the German economy relies (particularly as Germany accelerates the shutting down of 
all nuclear plants till 2022 at the latest). 
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Picture 5: True and pure expression of Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel (Source: 
express.co.uk) 
 
In addition, Germany and Russia have strong links apart from the states prime 
ministers and trade. 
According to the german newspaper Der Spiegel, Germany and Russia are bound by a 
history of cultural, political and economic contacts going back to tsarist times. 
Germans were a large and influential element in the Tsar's court.  Many of his top 
ministers and generals were German. Many Russians have German roots due to large 
scale German immigration to Russia over the centuries.  This is particularly true in St. 
Petersburg. Germany is the favorite destination for Russian immigration to the West.  
Today Russians together with Turks are the biggest migrant group in Germany. They 
are counted to be more than 3 millions according to 2012 records. Many East Germans 
speak Russian and were taught that Russia is a good and friendly country.  Resentment 
against former Russian domination is balanced by sympathy. 
 
 
 
The case of Ukraine 
 
A prolonged crisis in Ukraine began on 21 November 2013 when then-president Viktor 
Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association 
agreement with the European Union. The decision sparked mass protests from the 
advocates of the agreement. The protests, in turn, brought about a revolution that led 
to Yanukovych's ousting. After the ousting, unrest expanded in the largely Russophone 
(Russian speaking) eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where Yanukovych 
had drawn most of his support. Subsequently, an ensuing political crisis developed 
after Russia intervened militarily in aforementioned regions and annexed the then-
autonomous Ukrainian region of Crimea. As Russia's intervention emboldened the 
Russophone Ukrainians already in upheaval, the unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts devolved into a subnational war against the post-revolutionary Ukrainian 
government. Then, as that conflict progressed, the Russophone Ukrainian opposition 
turned into a pro-Russian insurgency  often supported and assistance by the Russian 
military and its special forces 
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 Picture 6: Russian Language devide. Data source: 2001 national census. (Source: Laris 
Karklis/Washington Post) 
 
 
 
Picture 7 : Regions claimed by Russia (Source: globaltruth.net) 
 
 
 
 
 
The annexation of Crimea Peninsula 
 
Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation in early 2014 and the peninsula, 
Ukrainian territory since 1954, is now administered as two Russian federal subjects: 
the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. Until 2016 these new 
subjects were grouped in the Crimean Federal District. The annexation was 
accompanied by a military intervention by Russia in Crimea that took place in the 
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aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and was part of wider unrest across 
southern and eastern Ukraine. 
 
On 22–23 February 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin convened an all-night 
meeting with security services chiefs to discuss the removal of deposed Ukrainian 
President, Viktor Yanukovych. On 23 February, pro-Russian demonstrations were held 
in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. On 27 February masked Russian troops without 
insignia took over the Supreme Council (parliament) of Crimea  and captured strategic 
sites across Crimea, which led to the installation of the pro-Russian Aksyonov 
government in Crimea, conducting the Crimean status referendum and the declaration 
of Crimea's independence on 16 March 2014. Russia claimed Crimea on 18 March 
2014. 
  
Worldwide reaction 
 
 Not only Ukraine but also many world leaders condemned the illegal  annexation of 
Crimea and consider the Russian move as a violation of international law and a 
contravention of territorial integrity of Ukraine that Russia itself has already signed an 
agreement on safeguarding the territory of Ukraine. Moreover Russia breached the 
following bilateral agreements with Ukraine such as ,Agreements on Establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, Helsinki Accords, Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994 and Treaty on friendship, cooperation 
and partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Then the members of 
the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA, EU) cancelled the meeting of 
G8 and suspended  Russia from the group, while proposing sanctions for the first 
round against Russia. From the perspective of the United Nations General Assembly it 
rejected the illegal annexation of Crimea  adopting a non-binding resolution affirming 
the "territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders". UN 
resolution asserted that the referendum and vote for independent Crimea have no 
legal basis and are not valid  , that means that any alteration of the integrity of Crimea 
does not apply with international law , calling all the countries globally and  
international organizations not to recognize Russia’s annnexation of Crimea. 
Moreover,In 2016, UN General Assembly reaffirmed  that there is no recognition of 
Russia’s annexation and Crimea is a part of Ukraine while condemning  "the temporary 
occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine and  Russia’s Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol". 
 
Moscow countered with the principle of self determination of peoples as it complies 
with the referendum of Crimea thus  opposing the "annexation" label. However, 
Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev said in July 2015 that Crimea was an integral 
part of Russian territory. 
 
Crimea’s Significance 
 
Crimea is strategically important as a base for the Russian navy. The Black Sea Fleet has 
been based on the peninsula since it was founded by Prince Potemkin in 1783. The 
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fleet’s strategic position helped Russia defeat Georgia in the South Ossetia war in 
2008, and remains crucial to Russian security interests in the region. 
Crimea still has a 60 per cent Russian population. Relations have been tense between 
Russia and Ukraine since the peninsula formally became part of Ukraine after the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Last week Russia’s upper house of parliament approved 
the use of force in Crimea, and the country has since demanded Ukrainian forces in the 
region surrender.  
Crimea’s geographic limitations and ambitions: 
 Russia's capacity to reach the sea is limited by geography, so ports in the north and 
south seas, leading to larger waters, are crucial. As the map (Picture 4) below 
illustrates, Sevastopol is a strategically important base for Russia's naval fleet, in 
addition to being Russia's only warm water base. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, a 1997 treaty with Ukraine allowed Russia to keep its Black Sea Fleet pretty 
much intact (with 15,000 personnel currently stationed) and lease the base at 
Sevastopol (extended to expire in 2042). 
                                     
Picture 8: Black Sea Region (Source : Wikimedia) 
Crimea’s Projecting power  
 
 Sevastopol has been an important hub to project Russia's naval power on a global 
platform. The Black Sea Fleet has seen a flurry of activity since 2008: during the war 
with Georgia that year, the fleet staged blockades in the Black Sea. The Russian navy 
was actively engaged with Vietnam, Syria and Venezuela (and up until March 2011, 
Libya) "for logistics and repair services in their principal ports". It has also been alleged 
that Sevastopol has served as the main source in supplying the Assad regime during 
Syria's civil war and proved useful with Russia's role in dismantling Syria's chemical 
weapons last year. After Syria's civil war forced Russia to stop using its naval base in 
the Syrian port of Tartus last year, Sevastopol became even more crucial. 
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The modern history of the Crimea begins with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by 
Catherine the Great in 1783 and the handing over of the Crimea by the Ottoman 
Empire to Russia as part of the Treaty provision. After two centuries of conflict, the 
Russian fleet had destroyed the Ottoman navy and the Russian army had inflicted 
heavy defeats on the Ottoman land forces. The ensuing Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
forced the Sublime Porte to recognize the Tatars of the Crimea as politically 
independent. Catherine the Great's incorporation of the Crimea in 1783 from the 
defeated Ottoman Empire into the Russian Empire increased Russia's power in the 
Black Sea area. The Crimea was the first Muslim territory to slip from the sultan's 
sovereignty. The Ottoman Empire's frontiers would gradually shrink for another two 
centuries, and Russia would proceed to push her frontier westwards to the Dniester. 
Russia’s stronghold in Crimea played a crucial role during its expansion westward. Thus 
Russian people consider it as an integral part of Russian history and cultural heritage. 
 
Russian Spirit 
 
The concept of Russian spirit countered its contemporary Official Nationality. Both 
based heavily upon Christian Orthodoxy, and both sought greatness in times gone by, 
but the Slavophiles found that greatness in the character of the peasant, while 
proponents of Official Nationality found it in allegiance to the autocrats. However, 
while these and other Romantic-influenced ideologies fell all across the spectrum of 
political thought, each trusted firmly in the inherent greatness of Russia. Russians are 
quite patriotic and believe in their country. Their country has been passing through 
many predicaments, wars, oligarchies, poverty, famines . Despite their poorness and 
misfortunes Russians believe true in their nation. 
The Motherland Calls located in  the compositional center of the monument-ensemble 
"Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad" on Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd. One of the 
tallest statues in the world, the tallest statue in Russia and Europe, and the tallest  
female statue in the world. Two hundred steps, symbolizing the 200 days of the Battle 
of Stalingrad, led from the bottom of the hill to the monument. The statue appears on 
both the current flag and coat of arms of Volgograd Oblast. 
For Russians there are strong ties with their motherland. They believe that she is the 
reason for them existence and they feel that they have as an obligation to fight for her 
and serve her.  
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Picture 9: The Motherland calls (Source: craiglotter.co.za) 
 
A Russian’s “Father” figure (who is in Heaven) is God the Father, often called “Our 
Heavenly Father” (Отче наш, отче Небесный). 
A Russian’s “Mother” figure (who is on Earth) is Russia itself, which starts with the vast 
Russian Land, which always needed to be protected from enemies outside and inside. 
He believes it is given by the Heavenly Father to us, so that we could bring our children 
up on it, and protect it by all means. 
Hence the placards with female figure calling soldiers for the fight. Russians fought for 
the “Mother Russia”. Just like the Americans fought for Uncle Sam (“I want YOU to the 
US ARMY” placard). 
This belief gives the Russians a twofold policy. “Чужой земли мы не хотим ни пяди, 
Но и своей вершка не отдадим”. (“We don’t want even <7”> of somebody else’s 
land, But will not yield even <1.75″>of ours.”) 
It means, a Russian will fight for his God-given land to death (just like he would for his 
mother), but has zero interest in conquering the lands belonging to the others. Russia 
would not attack unless it delivers attack from an opponent first.  
 
 
A challenging future 
 
 Taking all the above into consideration ,Kremlin has already adapted its energy policy 
with the West despite increasing diversification and liberalization attempts. Gazprom 
has expanded the gas supplies discounts to close partners such as Germany and Italy 
The Kremlin knows that its only hope of maintaining natural gas revenues in the face of 
a potential global shale boom is to lock its customers into price-competitive, long-term 
contracts. Moscow will keep on  showing that it can offer European consumers 
guaranteed high volumes. 
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Finally, Russia aims at entering   the growing East Asian energy markets and building 
connection that may be profitable in he future.Through diversification of its export 
customer list  the pressure  in the European market  would continue intensifying. 
However, Russia would face the aspect of finding financial assistance of high capital in 
order to pursue its strategies. The future planned Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil 
pipeline alone is predicted to cost nearly $15 billion. Russia has vast capital reserves 
although the financial crisis in 2009 but that does not mean that capitals are infinite. 
 
Moscow makes preparations for the challenges that Russia will face in the next two 
decades  as another energy cycle draws to an end. Putin seems to hold tight in his 
hands the future of Russia as his leadership win more and more proponents across 
Russia. As of his predecessors Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Putin is able to implement 
policies and strategy changes in the Russian energy field.The  russian reliance on high 
oil prices is a matter of discontent in Moscow,  Putin has  adpated in the new rules and 
to external shifts in energy production and consumption particularly those affecting 
the European natural gas market. Nonetheless,we cannot predict accurately how the 
sustainability model of Russia will remain viable or not. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
Taking all the above into consideration, I would like to  emphasize that Russia through 
its energy strategy which currently follows wants to protect not  only its financial 
interests but also to protect its own self against her enemies. Kremlin is very aware of 
the fact that if EU become so powerful Russia cannot face it efficiently. For this reason 
Russia chooses the bilateralisation of diplomatic relations among many European 
nations in order to provoke divisions and tensions. As I have already mentioned above 
Russia chooses this way of approaching this challange aiming at strengthening its own 
position in the global arena and not to control or inflitrate in other nations as other 
imperialistic nations prefer so. Last but not least, Russia acts as a defender despite 
Russias aggresive attitude towards  former Soviet republics such as Georgia and 
Ukraine. Unless Russia demonstrates a sign of power in the region, it is likely that 
Russia will lose ground. Russia’s opponents as NATO and EU are likely to inflitrate and 
in other republics such as  Belarus and Moldova except for Ukraine and Baltic states. 
Russias intimidating projections of being EU more and more powerful and influential 
may induce much more anger and stressing within Kremlin. Because of the fact that 
Russia is a defender and not an agressor in the global politcs Russia would not attack 
unless it delivers an attack first  that stems from the cultural values which rule the 
Russian society and the national belief of mother Russia.  
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